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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 David Lynn Stewart appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence (second offense).  Stewart 
argues that the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 On December 11, 2014, Nampa Police Officer Travis Poore stopped 
Stewart’s vehicle for travelling 26 miles per hour in a non-posted 20 miles per 
hour zone on 10th Avenue South in Nampa.  (R., pp.8-10.)  Officer Poore 
detected that Stewart had an odor of an alcoholic beverage on him, his eyes 
were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slurred, and he lacked balance, 
memory, and coordination.  (R., p.10.)  Stewart admitted drinking alcohol, but did 
not cooperate with breath testing, invalidating two 15-minute observation periods 
by burping.  (Id.)  After he was advised of the consequences of refusing to 
provide a breath sample, Stewart agreed to a blood draw, the analysis of which 
showed a blood alcohol concentration of .129.  (R., pp.10, 87.)  Officer Poore 
cited Stewart for driving under the influence (second offense).  (R., pp.7-8.)   
 Stewart filed a motion to suppress (R., pp.19-21), contending the traffic 
stop was illegal because “no notice is given to drivers in Nampa that they are 
entering a 20 MPH speed zone” (R., p.21).  The state filed an Objection to Motion 
to Suppress Evidence (“Objection”) (R., pp.28-34), contending “the City of 
Nampa has a uniform 20 mph speed limit unless otherwise noted” (R., p.30 (bold 
omitted)), and that the citywide speed limit signs “do comply with the City of 
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Nampa requirements that they be placed at the ‘major entrances’ to the city”1 (R., 
p.31).  The state’s Objection acknowledged the signs “might be ruled defective 
according to the state manual’s requirements in IDAPA for standardization of 
signs,” citing IDAPA 39.03.41 and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices 
(“MUTCD”), Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.  
(R., p.31.)  The state argued that the traffic stop should nevertheless be upheld 
because, even if the citywide speed limit signs were defective, the officer had 
“reasonable suspicion” to conduct a stop because he made a reasonable mistake 
of law under Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014).  (R., pp.31-34.)        
 In his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence, Stewart 
contended that the citywide speed limit signs were not valid because they were 
not black on white.  (R., p.41.)  Stewart also claimed that, “[i]n order for the court 
to find that Officer Poore made a reasonable mistake of law, it must find that he 
was familiar with Ordinance 1057,” the ordinance he said he relied on, and that “it 
would be patently unreasonable for him to believe Ordinance No. 1057 was the 
law of the city when it is apparent that a number of the speed zones set out in the 
ordinance are different than the actual posted speed limits as posted.”  (R., p.43.)  
                                            
1  The state appended to its Objection a copy of Nampa City Ordinance No. 
1057, which was passed in 1966 with the following provision: 
 
SECTION 2.  The city of Nampa is hereby authorized to post at 
every major entrance to the city of Nampa signs designating the 
speed limit in the city of Nampa to be twenty miles per hour (20 
m.p.h.) unless otherwise posted . . . .  For purposes of this 
paragraph a major entrance to the city shall be construed as every 
entrance which is a state or U.S. Highway or a through street as 
designated by chapter 13 of the Nampa City Code.   
 
(R., p.37.)   
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In short, Stewart argued that, by failing to realize the “unless otherwise posted” 
speed limit signs were defective, Officer Poore did not make a reasonable 
mistake of law; therefore, Stewart argued, under Heien, the officer lacked 
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.  (R., pp.40-44.)   
 The state filed a second Objection explaining that the fact that the speed 
limit signs on some of the roads differed from the speed limits specifically set 
forth in Ordinance No. 1057 did not change the default (or “unless otherwise 
posted”) speed limit for 10th Avenue South from 20 miles per hour.  (R., pp.45-
48.)  The state later filed an Amended Objection (R., pp.52-56) explaining that 
Ordinance No. 1057 had been repealed in 1988 and replaced with Ordinance 
2129, which incorporated into law a record of all speed zones through a map 
accessible at the City Engineer’s Office (R., pp.54-55, 62-71 (City Engineer’s 
map, attached as Appendix 1)).  That map prominently, with large bold letters, 
states in the top legend box, “Speed Limit 20 MPH Unless Otherwise Posted.”  
(See R., p.71.)  The map’s legend box also states in bold letters, “Signs as of 
10/16/2014,” and directly under that phrase it has a black circle with red interior 
followed by “Speed Limit 20 MPH Unless Otherwise Posted.”  (Id. (emphasis 
original).)  The map has many red circles indicating where the main roadways 
entering Nampa have signs reading “Speed Limit 20 MPH Unless Otherwise 
Posted.”2  (See id.)         
                                            
2  Officer Poore confirmed, and Stewart’s attorney seemingly agreed, that the 
citywide speed limit on 10th Avenue has always been 20 miles per hour.  (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.7-16; p.16, L.10 - p.17, L.8; p.20, L.15 - p.21, L.6.)   
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 At the suppression hearing, Officer Poore testified that he had been on the 
DUI enforcement team for about seven years, and on December 11, 2014 -- 
relying on his training, the “unless otherwise posted” speed signs, and Ordinance 
No. 1057 -- he performed a traffic stop of Stewart’s vehicle after clocking it at 26 
miles per hour on 10th Avenue South, which has no speed limit signs.  (Tr., p.8, 
L.4 - p.15, L.23.)  Officer Poore explained, “There are no speed limit signs there, 
so I was following the city code of 20 miles an hour unless otherwise posted.”3  
(Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24.)  The officer was unaware at the time of the stop that the 
citywide speed signage was not correct in its design, color, and size, but since 
that time, the signage has been corrected.  (Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.14, L.6.)  
 Stewart entered into evidence a photo (Def. Ex. A, attached as Appendix 
2) of one of the 20 citywide speed limit signs Officer Poore located after the 
incident. Stewart’s attorney questioned Officer Poore about how the sign did not 
comply with signage requirements regarding color, size, shape, and content.  
(Tr., p.17, L.10 – p. 21, L.6.)  The citywide speed limit sign shown in Defendant’s 
Exhibit A (see Appendix 2) does not appear to comply with the signage 
                                            
3  Section 2B.13.05 of the 2009 edition of the MUTCD (attached as Appendix 3), 
has been incorporated into Idaho law through I.C. § 49-201(3) and IDAPA 
39.03.41.004.  That section provides, “Speed Limit signs indicating the statutory 
speed limits shall be installed at entrances to the State and, where appropriate, 
at jurisdictional boundaries in urban areas.”  (Emphasis added.)  Because 10th 
Avenue South is wholly contained within the boundary of Nampa, it apparently 
was not required to have either a speed limit sign or an “unless otherwise posted” 
speed limit sign.  See https://www.google.com/maps/place/10th+S,+Nampa,+ID.   
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requirements of MUTCD, which, as noted, has been incorporated into Idaho law 
through I.C. § 49-201(3) and IDAPA 39.03.41.004.4  (Tr., p.17, L.10 – p.18, L.4.)   
 Stewart argued that, because the citywide “unless otherwise posted” 
speed limit signs did not comply with the regulations regarding sign design, the 
20 miles per hour speed limit was invalid and the 35 miles per hour speed limit 
provided for under I.C. § 49-654 was the correct speed limit.  (Tr., p.16, L.10 – 
p.21, L.6; p.38, Ls.18-22.)  Toward the end of the hearing, Stewart’s counsel 
asked if the state would concede that Ordinance No. 1057 had been repealed, 
and the prosecutor agreed that it had been repealed and replaced in 1988 by 
Ordinance No. 2129, which, through the City Engineer’s Office (and, impliedly, 
the map it maintained), retained the citywide 20 miles per hour maximum speed 
limit.  (Tr., p.40, Ls.20-25; see Appendix 1.)   
 Stewart argued that, even under Heien, Officer Poore did not make a 
reasonable mistake of law to believe that the 20 miles per hour non-posted 
speed limit on 10th Avenue was valid when the officer stopped his vehicle – 
because the signs’ design did not conform to specific legal requirements.  (Tr., 
p.34, L.17 – p.39, L.3.)  Lastly, Stewart asked the court to grant his suppression 
motion on independent state grounds under article 1, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution.  (Tr., p.36, L.15 – p.37, L.16.)   
                                            
4  Compare Defendant’s Exhibit A (see Appendix 2) with requirements of 2009 
MUTCD and its 2012 Supplement, proscribing the size, shape, color and writing 
for “speed limit” signs (2012 MUTCD Supplement, R2-1, attached as Appendix 
4), “unless otherwise posted” signs (id., “R2-5P,” attached as Appendix 5), 
“citywide” signs (id., “R2-5aPJ,” attached as Appendix 6), and how they are to be 
aligned together (2009 MUTCD, Sec. 2B.13.08, Appendix 3).   
 
 6 
 
 At the end of the suppression hearing, the magistrate judge ruled: 
For probably 49 years, back to 1966, officers have been patrolling 
these streets.  And at least I know for the past seven he’s enforced 
10th Avenue South at 20 miles an hour.[5]  You know, until you came 
along and raised these issues, [Defense Counsel], I mean, that’s 
just the way it was, and it was wrong.  I agree. They’ve now taken 
to fixing these issues.   
 
 And while I recognize that your client bears the brunt of this 
for going 26 in a 20 where technically it was 35 at that time, I think 
it’s improper for this court to extend the Guzman-type analysis to 
this situation.[6]  
  
 . . . . 
 
 So I’ve read your briefing.  They’re excellent arguments.  . . . 
But I think ultimately my conclusion is that I follow the reasoning in 
Heien, and I don’t extend further protections under these 
circumstances, so I’m going to deny the motion. 
 
(Tr., p.39, L.7 – p.40, L.2.)  After his suppression motion was denied, Stewart 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to driving under the influence (second 
offense) (R., pp.77-78), and was sentenced to 365 days of jail with 335 days 
suspended (R., p.80).  
 On appeal (R., pp.90-91), the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s 
denial of Stewart’s motion to suppress based on Heien, 135 S.Ct. 530, and 
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (R., pp.141-148).  Stewart timely 
appeals.  (R., pp.149-151.) 
 
                                            
5  Officer Poore testified that he had patrolled 10th Avenue South for the last 
seven years.  (Tr., p.26, Ls.16-21.)  When the magistrate judge asked Officer 
Poore if he had always enforced that area of 10th Avenue at 20 miles an hour, the 
officer answered “Yes.”  (Tr., p.26, Ls.22-24.)  
 
6  State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (declining to apply a 
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule under the Idaho Constitution).    
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ISSUE 
 Stewart states the issue on appeal as: 
 
1. Was Mr. Stewart’s detention unreasonable under the state 
and federal constitutions? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Stewart failed to show that suppression is necessary because Officer 
Poore’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Stewart Has Failed To Show That Suppression Is Necessary Because Officer 
Poore’s Mistake Of Law Was Objectively Reasonable 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Stewart argues that the district court erred in affirming the denial of his 
suppression motion.  He challenges the lower courts’ rulings that, under Heien v. 
North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014), because Officer Poore made a 
“reasonable” mistake of law when he stopped Stewart’s vehicle for traveling 26 
miles per hour in an unposted 20 miles per hour speed zone, suppression of 
evidence obtained as a result of the stop was unwarranted.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.6-21.)  Stewart also argues that, even if Officer Poore’s mistake of law was 
reasonable, the traffic stop should be invalidated, and the evidence obtained as a 
result of the stop suppressed, because article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-26.)  Stewart’s arguments fail.     
 The state argued below that, under Heien, Officer Poore’s alleged mistake 
of law -- that the speed limit on 10th Avenue South was 20 miles per hour -- was 
objectively reasonable, and thus, suppression was not warranted under the 
Fourth Amendment or article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.  Both the 
magistrate court and the district court correctly applied the law to the facts in 
accepting the state’s argument and finding the traffic stop constitutionally 
reasonable.  (R., pp.141-148; Tr., p.39, L.4 – p.40, L.2.)   
  
 9 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s 
decision.”  State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).  The 
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  Id. 
This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard.  
State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014).  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial 
court’s findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts.  Id. 
 
C. Officer Poore Made A Reasonable Mistake Of Law Which Does Not 
Require Suppression  
 
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).  A traffic 
stop is constitutionally justified, however, if the officer possesses a reasonable 
suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the vehicle is being driven contrary 
to traffic laws.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. 
Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Flowers, 
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131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct. App. 1998); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 
561, 916 P.2d at 1286 (citing State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12, 878 P.2d 
184, 186 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but 
more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.  Flowers, 131 
Idaho at 209, 953 P.2d at 649; Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286 
(citing Naccarato, 126 Idaho at 12, 878 P.2d at 186).  The reasonableness of the 
officer’s suspicion must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances 
at the time of the stop.  State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 
(Ct.  App. 1999). 
 Whether an officer’s mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop 
is an issue that has never been squarely addressed by Idaho’s appellate courts.  
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to 
address whether mistake of law invalidated traffic stop because “mistake at issue 
was primarily one of fact”); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 
2008) (where officer’s alleged mistake of law did not cause Buell’s detention, 
authorities addressing the viability of detentions based on mistakes of law were 
“inapposite”); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding it unnecessary to “resolve whether a police officer’s mistake of law is 
unreasonable per se” because, even “allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by 
police,” there was “nothing in the record from which it might be concluded that 
the officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable”).   
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However, in Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 534-540, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether an officer’s mistake of law will necessarily 
invalidate a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.  In that case, an officer 
stopped Heien because the vehicle in which he was travelling did not have two 
properly functioning brake lights.  Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 534.  The officer 
subsequently recovered cocaine during a consensual search of the vehicle.  Id.  
The trial court denied Heien’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the 
search.  Id. at 535.  However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the traffic stop was constitutionally invalid because N.C. Gen. St. 
§ 20-129(g), the state statute upon which the stop was based, required only that 
vehicles have one properly functioning brake light.  Id.  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the officer “could 
have reasonably, even if mistakenly, read the vehicle code to require that both 
brake lights be in good working order,” and that when an officer “acts reasonably 
under the circumstances, he is not violating the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (quoting 
State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 356 (N.C. 2012).  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court.  Id. at 534-540.  The Court 
reasoned: 
As the text [of the Fourth Amendment] indicates and we 
have repeatedly affirmed, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 
___, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (some internal 
quotation marks omitted).  To be reasonable is not to be perfect, 
and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the 
part of government officials, giving them “fair leeway for enforcing 
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the law in the community’s protection.”  Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).  
 
Id. at 536 (brackets added). 
 
The Supreme Court then noted its previous recognition that searches and 
seizures based upon mistakes of fact can be reasonable.  Id.  For example, the 
Court noted, the warrantless search of a home is reasonable if undertaken with 
the consent of a resident, and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of 
someone who reasonably appears to be but is not in fact a resident.  Id.  (citing 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–186 (1990)).  The Court found no 
distinction between this principle and reasonable mistakes of law:  
But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such 
mistakes are no less compatible with the concept of reasonable 
suspicion.  Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an 
officer’s understanding of the facts and his understanding of the 
relevant law.  The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either 
ground.  Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or 
the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: 
the facts are outside the scope of the law.  There is no reason, 
under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why 
this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a 
reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a 
similarly reasonable mistake of law.  
 
Id.     
 Finally, in Heien, the United States Supreme Court also recognized that a 
rejection of the state’s argument regarding objectively reasonable mistakes of 
law would be “hard to reconcile” with its prior opinion in DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 
(1979).  Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 538.  DeFillippo was seized for violating a statute 
which was subsequently deemed unconstitutionally vague.  Id. (citing DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. at 33-35).  At the time DeFillippo was arrested, however, “there was no 
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controlling precedent that this ordinance was or was not constitutional, and 
hence the conduct observed violated a presumptively valid ordinance.”  Id. (citing 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37).  Therefore, the Supreme Court held, the officer still 
had probable cause to arrest DeFillippo at the time of the arrest, and the search 
that recovered contraband from his person was still constitutional.  Id. (citing 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37-38).  
 Under Heien, it is absolutely clear that a reasonable mistake of law does 
not negate reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.  Absent some 
reasoned basis for holding otherwise, the same analysis should apply under 
article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.  Both the United States Supreme Court 
and Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that reasonable suspicion cannot 
be reduced to any precise legal formula, but must instead be based on 
commonsense judgments considering the totality of all of the circumstances 
known to the officer.  E.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); Ornelas 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); State v. Kessler, 151 Idaho 653, 655, 
262 P.3d 682, 684 (Ct. App. 2011).   
 The fact that a traffic stop need only be supported by reasonable 
suspicion and involves only a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual 
stopped differentiates this case from other cases in which the Idaho Supreme 
Court has declined to apply a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule 
under other circumstances.  See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 513-519, 
272 P.3d 483, 485-491 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 984-998, 
842 P.2d 660, 663-677 (1992).  While the fact that article 1, § 17 of the Idaho 
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Constitution may provide citizens greater protections from warrantless searches 
of their person, homes, cars and other property may be justified in light of the 
inherently invasive nature of such searches, the same concerns are not present 
when an officer, having an objectively reasonable (albeit mistaken) belief that a 
motorist has committed a traffic violation, briefly detains the motorist for the 
purpose of simply confirming or dispelling that suspicion.7 
 Here, it was not Officer Poore’s job to decide the legality and/or 
enforceability of Nampa’s default speed limit signs any more than it was the 
officer’s job in DeFillippo to determine the constitutionality of the statute in that 
case.  Officer Poore testified that, in stopping Stewart’s vehicle on 10th Avenue 
South, he relied on his training, the “unless otherwise posted” speed signs, and 
(the outdated) Ordinance No. 1057.  (Tr., p.8, L.4 - p.15, L.23.)  The officer 
explained that because there are no speed limit signs there, he was “following 
the city code of 20 miles an hour unless otherwise posted.”  (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-24.)  
The district court correctly determined that any mistake of law made by Officer 
Poore was reasonable.  The district court’s Memorandum Decision, attached as 
Appendix 7, is incorporated into this Respondent's Brief and relied upon as if fully 
                                            
7  Stewart has failed to examine several criteria relevant to showing a divergence 
between federal and state constitutional law: (1) the textual language of the state 
constitution; (2) significant differences in the text of parallel provisions of the 
federal and state constitutions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; 
(4) preexisting state law; (5) differences in structure It was not Officer Poore’s job 
to decide the legality and/or enforceability of Nampa’s default speed limit signs 
any more than it was the officer’s job in DeFillippo to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute in that case.  between the federal and state 
constitutions; (6) matters of particular state interest or local concern; (7) public 
attitudes; and (8) state traditions.  See, e.g., State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 
825 P.2d 501 (1992) (Bistline, J., concurring); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 
812-813 (Wash. 1986).   
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set forth herein.  In addition to the district court's reasoning, the state makes the 
following argument. 
 It is undeniable that Officer Poore was correct that a Nampa City 
Ordinance set a default speed limit of 20 miles per hour in zones where the 
speed limit is not posted – he simply cited an outdated Ordinance.  Nampa City 
Ordinance 2129, which replaced Ordinance 1057 in 1988, established that the 
speed zones in Nampa are maintained on maps on file in the City Engineer’s 
Office. (R., pp.60-71.)  In the legend box at the top of the City Engineer’s map, it 
states in large letters, “Speed Limit 20 MPH Unless Otherwise Posted.”  
(Appendix 1.)  The map’s legend box also states, “Signs as of 10/16/2014,” with 
a red dot followed by “Speed Limit 20 MPH Unless Otherwise Posted.”  (Id.)  The 
map itself has red dots showing where the “unless otherwise posted” roads are.  
(Id.)  Although Officer Poore testified that he was relying on the 20 miles per hour 
speed limit of Ordinance 1057, both Ordinances established 20 miles per hour 
speed zones where speed limit signs are not posted.  In short, 10th Avenue South 
was, by law, supposed to have a 20 miles per hour speed limit – regardless of 
what Ordinance number Officer Poore said he was relying upon.  See Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
 However, Officer Poore was unaware at the time of the stop that the 
“unless otherwise posted” speed limit signs did not meet the MUTCD regulations 
concerning design, color, lettering, and size.  (Tr., p.13, L.5 – p.14, L.6; p.17, 
L.21 – p.21, L.6.)  Despite the fact that Ordinance 2129 was a validly passed 
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local law setting the speed limit in unposted zones at 20 miles per hour, and the 
signs themselves said the same thing, Stewart contends it was unreasonable for 
the officer to not go further and discover that the signage was not in compliance 
with federal signage requirements, incorporated into Idaho law.  (See generally 
Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-18.)   
 Although not discussed by the lower courts, the underlying assumption of 
Stewart’s argument is that non-compliance with the MUTCD signage 
requirements invalidated the 20 miles per hour default speed limit of Ordinance 
2129.  Because Stewart has not presented any authority to support such 
assumption, his argument should not be considered on appeal.  See State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal 
are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered.”); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001) (This 
Court will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal analysis 
by applying the correct legal analysis.).   
 Even if considered, the district court correctly rejected the notion that 
Officer Poore’s alleged mistake of law was unreasonable.  The court concluded 
that, although perhaps unenforceable due to “technical defenses that might 
arise,” Nampa City Ordinance No. 2129 was a validly passed city Ordinance 
which, along with the officer’s clocked speed of Stewart’s vehicle, provided 
reasonable suspicion to stop Stewart for speeding in a 20 miles per hour zone, 
stating: 
Here, the Nampa officer was entitled to rely upon the existence of 
the Nampa city ordinance.  He could not be expected to know 
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whether the city council had completed all the statutory steps 
required for enforcement of the ordinance, or whether conflicting 
requirements under the state statute had been resolved.  The lack 
of these elements might affect the enforceability of any citation he 
might issue, but they do not impact the officer’s reasonably 
articulable suspicion formed at the time the decision to effect a stop 
was made.  The officer’s suspicion that a traffic offense might have 
been committed, based upon his training and experience, his 
personal observation of the speed of the defendant’s vehicle here, 
and his knowledge of the existence of the 20 mph speed limit 
ordinance is all that would be required for the traffic stop in the first 
instance. 
  
 I do not accept the defense argument that the technical 
defenses to the enforceability of the ordinance affects the existence 
of the ordinance.  The officer’s observation of an apparent violation 
of the ordinance calling for a 20 mph speed limit appears sufficient 
to be taken as an element of reasonable suspicion under the 
constitutional limits of an investigatory stop.  He is not required to 
try the case in his head and resolve the technical defenses that 
might arise before deciding to intervene. 
 
(R., pp.146-147 (internal citations omitted).) 
 Indeed, Stewart attempts to place the burden on Officer Poore to conduct 
legal research to determine whether the 20 miles per hour default speed limit and 
Ordinance 2129 were actually valid and/or effective due to proper signage.  
Officer Poore would have first had to have suspected the signs were defective in 
their design, which there is no indication of.  Next, the officer would had to have 
known that the 2009 edition of MUTCD, including revisions 1 and 2 of the Manual 
(with an effective date of June 13, 2012) had been incorporated into Idaho law.  
See I.C. § 49-201(3)); IDAPA 39.03.41.004); see also Nampa City Code, Chapter 
1, Title 7 (Traffic Regulations) section 7-1-4 (“Sign Specifications”). Then, only by 
reviewing the requirements of 2009 MUTCD and its 2012 Supplement in regard 
to the size, shape, color and lettering for “speed limit” signs (2012 MUTCD 
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Supplement, R2-1; Appendix 4), “unless otherwise posted” signs (id., “R2-5P,” 
Appendix 5), “citywide” signs (id., “R2-5aPJ,” Appendix 6), and how they are to 
be aligned together (2009 MUTCD, Sec. 2B.13.08, Appendix 3), would Officer 
Poore have been able to conclude that the signs did not comply with the federal 
guidelines.   
 Moreover, Officer Poore would had to have some basis to conclude that, 
pursuant to Idaho law, such “signage” non-compliance with MUTCD rendered 
Ordinance 2129’s 20 miles per hour default speed limit invalid.  See I.C. § 49-
208(2) (“No ordinance or regulation enacted under . . . this section shall be 
effective until traffic-control devices giving notice of local traffic regulations are 
erected upon or at the entrances to the highway or part affected as may be most 
appropriate.”).  Rather than placing the obligation on the officer to investigate the 
legality and enforceability of a validly authorized Nampa City Ordinance due to 
incorrect sign design, the district court correctly concluded that Officer Poore was 
“not required to try the case in his head and resolve the technical defenses that 
might arise before deciding to intervene.”  (R., p.147.)   
 For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should hold that, although 
the design (size, shape, color, etc.) of the citywide default speed limit signs did 
not conform with the 2009 edition of the MUTCD (etc.), suppression of evidence 
is not warranted under the Fourth Amendment or article 1, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution because Officer Poore’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable.  
 In sum, Officer Poore reasonably concluded that Stewart was travelling 26 
miles per hour in a 20 mile per hour speed zone “apparently” regulated by the 
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citywide default speed limit signs and established by a city ordinance.  Therefore, 
because any mistake of law was objectively reasonable, Stewart has failed to 
show that he is entitled to suppression. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
appellate decision and the magistrate court’s order denying Stewart’s motion to 
suppress.  
 DATED this 19th day of April, 2017. 
 
 
            
      _/s/ John C. McKinney_____ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 3 
Chapter 2B - MUTCD 2009 Edition - FHW A Page 17 of 53 
03 Speed Limit (R2-1) signs, indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, 
shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. 
04 At the downstream end of the section to which a speed limit applies, a Speed Limit sign 
showing the next speed limit shall be installed. Additional Speed Limit signs shall be 
installed beyond major intersections and at other locations where it is necessary to remind 
road users of the speed limit that is applicable. 
os Speed Limit signs indicating the statutory speed limits shall be installed at entrances to 
the State and, where appropriate, at jurisdictional boundaries in urban areas. · 
Support: 
06 In general, the maximum speed limits applicable to rural and urban roads are established: 
A. Statutorily - a maximum speed limit applicable to a particular class of road, such as freeways or 
city streets, that is established by State law; or 
B. As altered speed zones - based on engineering studies. 
07 State statutory limits might restrict the maximum speed limit that can be established on a 
particular road, notwithstanding what an engineering study might indicate. 
Option: 
08 If a jurisdiction has a policy of installing Speed Limit signs in accordance with statutory 
requirements only on the streets that enter a city, neighborhood, or residential area to indicate the 
speed limit that is applicable to the entire city, neighborhood, or residential area unless otherwise 
posted, a CITYWIDE (R2-5aP), NEIGHBORHOOD (R2-5bP), or RESIDENTIAL (R2-5cP) plaque may be 
mounted above the Speed Limit sign and an UNLESS OTHERWISE POSTED (R2-5P) plaque may be 
mounted below the Speed Limit sign (see Figure 2B-3). 
Guidance: 
09 A Reduced Speed Limit Ahead (W3-5 or W3-5a) sign (see Section 2C.38) should be used to 
inform road users of a reduced speed zone whete the speed limit is being reduced by more than 10 
mph, or where engineering judgment indicates the need for advance notice to comply with the posted 
speed limit ahead. 
10 States and local agencies should conduct engineering studies to reevaluate non-statutory speed 
limits on segments of their roadways that have undergone significant changes since the last review, 
such as the addition or elimination of parking or driveways, changes in the number of travel lanes, 
changes in the configuration of bicycle lanes, changes in traffic control signal coordination, or 
significant changes in traffic volumes. 
11 No more than three speed limits should be displayed on any one Speed Limit sign or assembly. 
12 When a speed limit within a speed zone is posted, it should be within 5 mph of the 85th-
percentile speed of free-flowing traffic. 
13 Speed studies for signalized intersection approaches should be taken outside the influence area of 
the traffic control signal, which is generally considered to be approximately 1/2 mile, to avoid 
obtaining skewed results for the 85th-percentile speed. 
Support: 
14 Advance warning signs and other traffic control devices to attract the motorist's attention to a 
signalized intersection are usually more effective than a reduced speed limit zone. 
https ://muted. fhwa.dot. gov /htm/2009 /part2/part2b .htm 3/29/2017 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S MEHIEL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID LYNN STEWART, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR 2014-27456-N 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This case is before the court on appeal from a decision of the magistrate below 
denying a motion to suppress. The appellant, defendant below, is David Lynn Stewart, 
who appears by counsel, Robyn Fyffe, Boise. The respondent is the State of Idaho, which 
appears by counsel, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Francis J. Zebari, Canyon County 
Prosecutor's Office, Caldwell, Idaho. The case was fully briefed and argued to the court 
at a hearing in the courtrooms of this court in the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, 
on Thursday, May 26, 2016. The case been duly and fully submitted, the court renders its 
decision as follows. 
Memorandum Decision 1 
t . 
For reasons stated, the decision of the magistrate below is affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
Around 7:30 p.m. on December 11, 2014, defendant was stopped by a Nampa 
police officer while driving from the downtown business area on 10th A venue. The 
officer said he had clocked defendant driving 26 mph in an area the officer believed to be 
governed by a 20 mph speed zone. There were no signs indicating the speed limit on 10th 
A venue. The stop ripened into a DUI inquiry, and the defendant was eventually charged 
with driving under the influence - second arrest. 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence produced after the traffic stop, 
contending the officer had no cause for the stop. At a hearing before the magistrate judge, 
the evidence adduced was that there was no specific ordinance fixing a speed limit on 
10th A venue. There was, and is, a general ordinance that unless posted otherwise, the 
default speed limit on any street in Nampa is 20 mph. (Ordinance 2129, enacted October 
3, 1988.) However, there are no signs posted on 10th Avenue stating what the speed limit 
is. 
Defendant argued that the issue was controlled by Idaho Code § 49-654, which 
provides in its relevant parts that "No person shall drive a motor vehicle ... at a speed in 
excess of ... Thirty five (35) miles per hour in any residential, business or urban district, 
unless otherwise posted in accordance with section 49-207(2) or (3), Idaho Code ... " The 
argument is that without a valid sign posting a lower speed, the state statute controls, 
meaning that a 35 mph speed limit applies where the stop occurred. 
Memorandum Decision 2 
The magistrate found that the officer had mistakenly believed that the 20 mph 
speed limit applied when he pulled the Defendant over for driving 26 mph on a stretch of 
road where Idaho Code§ 49-654's default 35 mph speed limit might have applied. 
However, he also found that the officer's mistake was a reasonable mistake oflaw and 
that, under Helen v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct 530 (2014), such a mistake could "in 
circumstances be used to justify an investigatory stop." The magistrate also found that 
the Idaho Constitution did not afford defendant greater protection in these circumstances 
than the federal constitution, as interpreted by Helen. He denied the motion to suppress. 
The defendant then entered a guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the 
suppression issue. Judgement was entered and this appeal was timely filed. 
Issue Presented 
Under the circumstances of this case, did the officer have sufficient cause to effect 
a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle at the time and place in question? 
Analysis 
The defendant argues that without a proper sign in the vicinity, the municipal 
speed limit ordinance is not enforceable. If the municipal ordinance is not enforceable, 
then the ordinance itself is invalid and the state statute controls, which establishes a 
default speed limit within urban areas of 35 mph. Since the defendant was only driving 
26 mph, he was within the state mandated speed limit. As the officer had no other cause 
to initiate the stop, the defendant argues that the stop was effected without probable 
cause. I do not find the argument persuasive. 
Memorandum Decision 3 
It is not disputed that the state statute permits municipalities to enact local 
ordinances establishing lower speed limits than that imposed by the state statute. It is also 
not disputed here that the City of Nampa has such an enactment in Ordinance 2129, 
enacted in October of 1988. There is no evidence of any amendments or changes to the 
ordinance that would be relevant to any issue in this case. There was no evidence offered 
that the ordinance was not duly and correctly enacted by the city council, in a manner 
contemplated by the statutes and approved by the city council, etc. It is also not disputed 
that speed limit signs complying with the state statutes and regulations were not in place 
on 10th avenue on the night in question. Finally, there was no challenge and no evidence 
offered on any other technical requirements imposed by state statute, though the 
defendant has suggested that that speed limit signs posted elsewhere in Nampa may not 
have complied with certain administrative rules that address the size, shape and 
composition of traffic signs and signals. 
The officer testified that he was aware of the general ordinance establishing the 
speed limit in Nampa at 20 mph unless otherwise posted, and was aware that signs to that 
effect existed in other areas of the city. He was not aware of the requirement for speed 
limit signage, and was not aware that if he ticketed anyone in the vicinity of the speed 
limit signs, the ticket might not be enforced due to the fact that those signs arguably did 
not comply with applicable traffic sign and signal regulations. 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed a somewhat similar issue in 
Heien v North Carolina, 574 U.S._, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014). There, the officer stopped a 
vehicle with only one operating tail light under what the Court termed an "honest but 
mistaken" belief that the law required two operating tail lights. In fact, the law only 
Memorandum Decision 4 
required one light. The trial court denied the motion to suppress; the intermediate court 
reversed; the state Supreme Court reversed it back; and the United States Supreme Court 
granted cert. The high court held that although it was true that the officer's mistake in the 
law would not support a conviction if a citation had been issued, !t does not necessarily 
follow that the officer's mistake here would not still support an i1.1vestigatory stop. See 
Helen, 135 S.Ct. at 538 ("Although [the defendant] could not be prosecuted under the 
identification ordinance, the search that turned up the drugs was constitutional."). 
The defense argues that the ordinance does not come into existence at all until the 
technical requirements of the state statute are complied with, and until that time, the state 
statute's default speed limit provision provides the speed limit in the area. However, they 
offer no authority for proposition that the ordinance does not come into existence and I 
do not accept the premise of the argument. There was no evidence here that the ordinance 
was not duly enacted by the city, that the ordinance establishing the speed limit at 20 mph 
did not exist on the date in question, that it was not on the books, or was not apparently 
enforceable in other areas of Nampa where necessary signs had been erected. To the 
contrary, as is important to the facts of this case, all of these factors did exist and were 
generally known by the officer at the time of the stop. 
The fact that appropriate signs were not present in the area of 10th Avenue did not 
impact the validity of the ordinance, or the existence of the law. The absence of signs 
might impact the ability of the state to enforce the law, but that is not required as 
necessary to the foundation for an investigatory stop. The magistrate found as a fact that 
the officer had a good faith belief that the 20 mph speed limit was in place. There was 
Memorandum Decision 5 
s 
foundation for this belief, in the city ordinance that did exist and was on the books. In my 
opinion, that was a sufficient foundation for the stop in this case. 
Michigan v DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) is instructive. There, the high court 
held that an officer was entitled to rely upon the validity of an existing ordinance, and 
could not be held to know that it would be held invalid if challenged or was otherwise 
unenforceable. Here, the Nampa officer was entitled to rely upon the existence of the 
Nampa city ordinance. He could not be expected to know whether the city council had 
completed all the statutory steps required for enforcement of the ordinance, or whether 
conflicting requirements under the state statute had been resolved. The lack of these 
elements might affect the enforceability of any citation he might issue, but they do not 
impact the officer's reasonably articulable suspicion formed at the time the decision to 
effect a stop was made. The officer's suspicion that a traffic offense might have been 
committed, based upon his training and experience, his personal observation of the speed 
of the defendant's vehicle here, and his knowledge of the existence of the 20 mph speed 
limit ordinance is all that would be required for the traffic stop in the first instance. See 
also, Peck v Idaho Transportation Department, 153 Idaho 37, 46-48, 278 P.3rd 439, 448-
50 (Ct. App. 2012) (officer's reliance on an existing municipal speed limit ordinance to 
conduct a traffic stop is valid unless the municipality has exceeded its statutory authority 
by enacting that ordinance). 
I do not accept the defense argument that the technical defenses to the 
enforceability of the ordinance affects the existence of the ordinance. The officer's 
observation of an apparent violation of the ordinance calling for a 20 mph speed limit 
appears sufficient to be taken as an element of reasonable suspicion under the 
Memorandum Decision 6 
constitutional limits of an investigatory stop. He is not required to try the case in his head 
and resolve the technical defenses that might arise before deciding to intervene. 
Conclusion 
The magistrate's ruling in denying the motion to suppress is sustained. There is no 
reason to interfere with the judgment of conviction in this case, and it is affirmed. 
Dated this L day of June, 2016. 
Sr. Judge D. Duff McKee 
Memorandum Decision 
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